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TERRORISM AND INSURANCE MARKETS:
A ROLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT AS INSURER?
ANNE GRON"
ALAN 0. SYKES*
ABSTRACT
Since September 11, 2001, insurance markets have been struggling to
adjust to new information about the magnitude of risks posed by
terrorism, and to the loss of tens of billions of dollars in reserves because
of claims relating to the September 11 attacks. Insurance coverage for
terror-related losses has become more expensive and for some risks
difficult or impossible to obtain. As a result, various interest groups
called for the federal government to provide coverage for terrorism
losses, resulting in the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002. We
question the wisdom of measures of this sort. They are likely to come
too late to address short-term market disruption, and in the long run may
well supplant or distort desirable market responses to the new
information about terrorism risk.
The terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 created chaos
in the insurance industry. Insurers immediately refused to sell more than
minimal coverage to any airline for ground damage, placing airlines in difficulty
with both creditors and regulators.! Property and casualty reinsurers, who will
bear the brunt of the $40 billion or more in claims resulting from the destruction
of the World Trade Center,2 announced that they would no longer sell coverage
for acts of terrorism. The insurance industry responded by announcing that acts
of terrorism would be excluded from coverage under commercial policies in
future renewals, a state of affairs that might place the owners of some
commercial properties in breach of loan covenants and may leave commercial
lenders hesitant to make new loans
The Bush administration quickly obtained temporary authority for the
Federal Aviation Administration to provide insurance coverage to airlines for
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I. See Barbara De Lollis, Airlines Plan to Create Insurance Company; Insurers Had
StoppedSelling War Risk Policies After September 11 Coverage, USATODAY, Mar. 7,2002, at 2B.
2. Jackie Spinner, Insurers See Terror Coverage Delays Unless US. Helps, WASH. POST,
Jan. 18, 2002, at E3.
3. See Adrian Michaels, Insurance Chief Warns US. Business of Cover Loss: Terror
Attacks Widespread Disruption and Breaches of Loan Covenants Predicted Unless Legislation
Passed, FiN. TIMES (London), Dec. 6, 2001, The Americas, at 12.
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ground damage, a program that remains in force subject to periodic votes on
renewal. Broader proposals for government participation passed both houses of
Congress and were signed by President Bush in November 2002. The legislation
provided federal coverage for up to 90% of the cost of a terrorist attack that
creates losses in excess of $10 billion and up to a total of $100 billion for three
years.5
This paper inquires whether a lack of insurance coverage for terrorist acts
warrants government intervention, and in particular whether government should
serve as the insurer of last resort going forward. Our answer to this question is
a tentative "no." We stipulate at the outset that our general suspicion of
government involvement rests more on empirical judgments, grounded in
significant part on previous experiences with government as an insurer, than on
tight theoretical arguments.
In brief, the problems with the affordability and availability of terrorism
insurance can be divided into two categories. The first group of problems arises
from the temporary capacity shortage attributable to the significant decline in
industry capital following the events of September 11. These problems affect
terrorism exposures of a low to moderately large magnitude which are
diversifiable and thus would be insurable in a market not afflicted by a capacity
shortage. Many of these temporary capacity shortages have occurred over the
past several decades, with the most recent associated with catastrophe insurance
in the early 1990s. These transitory periods of capacity shortage are often called
insurance crises because they are characterized by large reductions in the
availability of insurance (encompassing both increased deductibles and reduced
limits) along with large price increases and, at times, a lack of coverage at any
price for the lines most affected. The problems associated with the current
capacity shortage are amplified because the events of September 11 occurred at
a time when property-casualty insurance prices were already rising and insurers
had significant risk overhang from other property policies in force. Those events
caused insurers to revise upward their judgments about the probability of a
terrorist act and the associated losses, but considerable uncertainty still exists
about both. To manage this altered risk, insurers now want to rebalance their
exposures geographically and better diversify their portfolios, a process which
has made them reluctant to write new terrorism coverage.
The problems arising from a temporary capacity shortage and associated
complications are short-term and can be expected to be self-correcting. For
example, a little more than six months after the attacks, insurers were ready to
begin writing some policies that they refused to sell six months earlier (such as
substantial coverage for ground damage caused by airliners).' Barring new
shocks to the market, this trend should continue and availability and pricing for
4. See De Lollis, supra note 1.
5. Bush Signs Terror Insurance Bill Sought by Industry, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERV.,
Nov. 26, 2002.
6. Christopher Oster, AIG Urges FAA to End Airlines' War Insurance, WALL ST. J., Feb.
26, 2002.
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some terrorism coverage will likely improve substantially (although premiums
will assuredly be higher, reflecting the higher expected loss). Any further
government participation in the market for coverage of these losses is likely
unnecessary and may well be counterproductive.
We note also that some of the adjustment will occur on the part of insureds,
not just their insurers. If loan contracts call for borrowers to carry "all risk"
insurance, for example, and coverage for one of the risks encompassed by that
term (terrorism) is no longer available, borrowers and lenders have the option of
adjusting their contractual relationship. Lenders can simply reprice the loans
upward and waive the requirement of terrorism coverage. For many properties
where the risk of terrorism is extremely low, the price adjustment will be trivial.
And for types of properties where the risk is perceived to be great, it is hardly
obvious that the lending market should proceed as if September 11 had never
happened-it may well be desirable for some commercial development to be
curtailed or reoriented in response to the greater threat of terrorism that now
exists.
A second set of problems relates to insurance for large-scale, catastrophic
terrorist acts, such as the detonation of nuclear weapons in major cities. To be
sure, these types of events will likely remain uninsurable. But that has always
been the case. Readers need do no more than glance at their homeowners'
policies for evidence. They will likely find among the losses not insured such
items as losses due to "acts of war," enumerated to include such acts as the
discharge of a nuclear weapon. Similarly, losses due to nuclear hazard are likely
excluded from coverage.7 As we discuss further below, it is not difficult to
understand why private insurers do not cover such losses. The essence of
insurance is risk pooling and diversification, so that aggregate losses become
predictable and insurers can have a high degree of confidence that their
premiums and investment income will cover their loss payouts and expenses.
Coverage for the rare but massive losses that threaten insurers with insolvency
will only be offered (if at all) at a hefty premium above their actuarial value, a
premium that insureds will likely find excessive in relation to their willingness
to pay to lay off risk, and doubly so if insurer default is a concern.
If the private market lacks the capital to write coverage for these large and
nondiversifiable losses, should the government step in to supply it? The short
answer is that the government does supply it in a sense, although not through
formal insurance contracts. Federal aid to New York City following the recent
terrorist attacks was authorized at about $25 billion. A compensation fund for
victims has been established that will ensure each decedent's estate a six or seven
figure payment. More generally, one would be hard-pressed to identify any large
scale domestic catastrophe in modern times-whether flood, earthquake,
volcanic eruption, or hurricane-where the federal government did not offer
considerable aid after the fact.
The question then becomes a more subtle one-should the government enter
7. One of the authors' Illinois State Farm Homeowner's Policy contains all of these
exclusions (on file with author).
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the insurance market ex ante and commit itself contractually to cover particular
losses relating to terrorism, or should it instead rely on the private market to
insure the diversifiable losses and step in with an appropriate aid package ex post
in the event of something catastrophic and uninsured? We favor the latter
approach, for three reasons. First, past experience with the government as formal
participant in insurance markets is not comforting. The government rarely prices
or manages risks as would a private insurer with sufficient capital, particularly
when there is already a large constituency of policyholders and creditors
advocating more coverage at lower prices. The result is a mix of subsidies,
cross-subsidies, moral hazard and adverse selection that distort behavior, as well
as improperly priced government insurance that may crowd out efficient private
insurance. These distortions may well swamp any efficiencies from improved
risk sharing. The "Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002," passed by both
houses of Congress in November 2002, is illustrative of the problem--the
government will simply assume the losses incurred above a certain (rather low)
aggregate, charging nothing for that protection and thereby subsidizing insurers
who have already sold policies on the premise that they would have to cover at
least some of those losses.' Although this program is ostensibly "temporary,"
political pressures to leave this subsidy in place may prove irresistible. The
beneficiaries are well-organized groups of insurers, real estate developers, and
the like, while the losers are the diffusely organized and perhaps poorly-informed
group of taxpayers at large.
Second, given past experience with government accumulation of funds for
future disbursement, there is little reason to think that such funds would be
treated much differently than general revenues. If insurance premiums would
likely be based on political rather than economic considerations, and if
accumulated premium revenues would be treated as fungible with other revenue
sources, we see little reason to set up a new apparatus for the collection of
insurance premiums.
Finally, in the event of the most catastrophic type of terrorist attack,
governmental resources may be severely strained. It is by no means clear that ex
ante arrangements committing scarce resources to particular property owners will
allocate those resources most efficiently even with a $100 billion cap on federal
payments as enacted..
In offering these tentative judgments about the wisdom of government
involvement, we are not unmindful of the evidence that a lack of terrorism
coverage is presently causing genuine disruption in some markets. The press is
replete with anecdotal references to project financing that is on hold because "all
risk" coverage is unavailable. President Bush has cited the example of a large
Nevada resort development that cannot obtain financing, and mortgage bankers
and real estate developers seem widely supportive of government stepping into
the breach.9 But it simply does not follow that government should act. The real
8. Ins. Info. Inst., Hot Topics and Insurance Issues: Terrorism and Insurance, at http://www.
iii.org/media/hottopics/insurancelseptl 1/.
9. Mark A. Hoffman, Bush Renews Push for Terror Cover Aid, BUS. INS., Apr. 15, 2002.
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estate industry and the lenders that support it would of course like to return to the
days before September II when terrorism risk was perceived to be a de minimis
cost of doing business, and they will happily support programs to shift the
increased risk to taxpayers. But terrorism risk is a cost like any other that ought
to be internalized by developers, not externalized. If it cannot be laid off on
insurers for the time being at a price that developers find congenial due to a
capacity shortage, it does not follow that government should assume the risk
instead. The optimal response to the short-term insurance crisis may well be for
lenders and borrowers to revise their contracts to recognize that insurance is
temporarily unavailable, and to reprice them accordingly. In the long term, any
lasting policy exclusions for catastrophic losses due to terrorist acts should be no
more disruptive to project finance than exclusions for acts of war, which have
persisted without causing any great difficulty for decades.
The sections that follow develop and refine these arguments. We begin with
some positive economics on the insurance industry and the "capacity constraints"
that afflict it in times of uncertainty following large shocks, as well as some
history relating to previous insurance "crises."
I. THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE "CRISES"
Crises in the availability of private insurance coverage are not unfamiliar.
During the 1980s, certain lines of liability insurance increased in price
spectacularly, and a few became altogether unavailable (such as certain lines of
medical malpractice coverage).' The most recent crisis occurred in the early
1990s following Hurricane Andrew when reinsurers exited the market for
coverage of catastrophic risks, leading domestic casualty to insurers to fear that
another major disaster might threaten their solvency." Such crises also produced
political support for governmental actions to reduce insurers' exposure to risk,
and indeed one can trace some modem tort reforms and initiatives such as the
California Earthquake Authority in part to these episodes.' The liability and
catastrophe insurance crises also spawned a fair amount of theoretical and
empirical research into the reasons for them.
A. The Theory of Insurance Capacity Limits
The insurance crises of the past, as well as the present situation with respect
to terrorism coverage, all arose following large, unanticipated losses for insurers.
At first blush, the unwillingness of insurers to sell coverage at such times, or a
large increase in required premiums relative to expected losses, presents a puzzle.
After all, insurers are in the business of bearing risk, and it is not obvious why
an increase in the riskiness of their business would give them pause-premiums
10. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521, 1521, 1522, 1527 (1987).
II. See generally THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999).
12. Regarding the latter, see generally David A. Moss, Courting Disaster?: The
Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy Since 1803, in id. at 307.
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will rise when the expected value of covered losses rises to be sure, but why
should insurers refuse to write coverage at all or charge premiums far in excess
of expected losses? Instead, one might expect insurance actuaries to take their
best guess regarding future expected losses as new information comes in, and to
make coverage available for a premium that covers expected costs.
Insurance crises are part of a larger pattern of pricing and availability in
insurance markets, sometimes referred to as the insurance cycle. During the
crisis phase, the most affected lines of business experience rapidly increasing
prices accompanied by severely restricted quantity. Coverage may become
unavailable for a very few types of losses and insureds. During this time most
insurers realize great improvements in profitability and are able to increase their
capital from retained earnings. Over time, the crisis phase or tight market lessens
and prices may fall as the availability of coverage significantly increases. This
period of relative stability typically gives way eventually to a soft market where
prices are quite low, availability is abundant, and insurer profitability is quite
low. The soft market generally persists until another large, unanticipated
industry loss reduces industry capacity to the point where another crisis arises.
Various theories have emerged through the years to explain insurers'
behavior during tight markets. Some economists argued that tightness was due
to foolish loss forecasting that underpredicted losses during periods of rising
losses and overpredicted them during periods where losses had stabilized, rather
akin to the famous "cobweb" model of naive price forecasting in elementary
microeconomic theory. 3 The difficulty with this theory, of course, is that it
relies on perpetual stupidity on the part of insurance actuaries, not a very
appealing assumption. It also fails to explain why insurance coverage might
become unavailable altogether.
Others have suggested that regulatory drag contributes to cycles, with periods
of increased losses followed by periods during which regulators constrain the
ability of insurers to write coverage in order to protect solvency. 4 These theories
primarily aim at explaining the time series pattern of profitability across the cycle
and are not well suited to explain the quantity changes associated with profit
movements over the cycle. The claim that regulation is the central reason for
cycles is at best incomplete. Reinsurance markets are largely unregulated, for
example, yet some of the most prominent "crises" (including the catastrophic risk
situation in the early 1990s and the dearth of terrorism coverage) arose from an
unwillingness of reinsurers to write coverage.
With particular reference to the 1980s' liability crisis, still other writers
suggested that adverse selection in the commercial casualty market was the
problem. As losses grew due to changes in liability rules, the story ran, the
difference in risk exposure between "good types ' and "bad types" increased,
leading more "good types" to exit the insurance market leaving behind "bad
13. See generally Emilio C. Venezian, Ratemaking Methods and Profit Cycles in Property
and Liability Insurance, 52 J. RISK & INS. 477 (1985).
14. J.D. Cummins & J.F. Outreville, An International Analysis of Underwriting Cycles in
Property-Liability Insurance, 54 J. RISK & INS. 246, 250 (June 1987).
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types" and higher premiums.15 This theory has some explanatory power, but has
a more difficult time with crises in other lines of insurance such as the recent
catastrophe insurance crisis in the early 1990s (where adverse selection seems
much less of a problem), and it does not explain some elements of the 1980s'
liability crisis. For example, many liability policies were canceled during the
crisis, but adverse selection should not cause insureds or insurers to cancel
insurance that is sold before the market begins to unravel. 6 In addition, if the
market was unraveling during the liability insurance crisis, why did total
premiums collected approximately triple? 7 An unraveling market should
produce a drop in premiums. 8
Another line of theory emphasizes capital market constraints on insurers as
an explanation for tightness in the market.'9 The key assumption is that external
capital is more expensive than internal capital. For insurance companies in
particular, it is likely that the capital markets will be suspicious of insurers trying
to raise capital in the face of a recent increase in loss payouts. Some such
insurers may simply be seeking the reserves needed to write profitable new
policies, but others may be hoping to externalize the costs of expected future
losses to unwitting new investors. If investors have difficulty telling these
categories of insurers apart, all insurers may pay a hefty risk premium for outside
capital, especially following a substantial increase in covered losses.
In general, when external capital is more expensive than internal capital, the
value of any firm is likely to be concave in internal capital, causing the firm to
act as if it is risk averse.2" This situation arises from the fact that some positive
value investment projects will be profitable if financed using internal funds but
not if financed using external funds. A reduction in available internal capital
thus reduces the firm's willingness to undertake some new investment projects,
while an increase in internal capital makes more projects profitable. Because
investment opportunities exhibit diminishing returns, however, a reduction in
internal capital is more costly than a comparable increase in internal capital,
producing the concavity noted above. Significant bankruptcy costs can produce
a similar result.
An insurer operating under these conditions will act as if it is risk averse and
will manage its insurance portfolio to reduce the variance of the returns.2 As a
15. See Priest, supra note 10, at 1562; Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Insurance Market, 5
J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 123, 124, 131 (Summer 1991).
16. See Anne Gron & Andrew Winton, Risk Overhang and Market Behavior, 74 J. Bus. 59 1,
606(2001).
17. See Winter, supra note 15, at 126 (reporting that net premiums written rose from $6.5
billion to $19 billion during the 1984-86 episode).
18. Id.
19. See Anne Gron, Capacity Constraints and Cycles in Property-Casualty Insurance
Markets, 25 RANDJ. ECON. 110, 112 (Spring 1994); Gron & Winton, supra note 16.
20. Gron & Winton, supra note 16, at 594, 607.
2 1. The same argument applies to the typical corporation, offering an explanation of why
otherwise risk neutral firms purchase insurance and engage in other forms of risk management. A
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result, the insurer will require a positive risk premium to assume risks that are
positively correlated with other risks in the portfolio (a negative "risk premium"
is also possible as to risks that are negatively correlated with the other risks in the
portfolio).' Insurers who effectively diversify their insurance portfolios will be
able to offer lower prices (for a given probability of bankruptcy). Competition
among insurers will thus lead insurers to manage their insurance portfolios to
diversify risks either by directly adjusting their exposures sold or by the use of
various types of reinsurance.23 As a result, the risk premia required by different
insurers for the same type of risk will tend to converge.
With this background, it is easy to see how internal capital affects the
"capacity" of the insurance industry. The capacity theory of cycles posits that
insurance crises arise from a temporary shortage of industry capital. To go from
the firm level discussion above to what happens at the industry level, note that
because each insurer's ability to bear risk is related to its individual level of
capital, the aggregate risk that the industry will assume at a reasonable
probability of solvency is related to the aggregate level of capital that insurers
have in the short run.
The level of capital in the industry is subject to random shocks arising from
shocks to asset values and unexpected loss realizations. Unexpected losses can
come from several sources but often arise when insurers have underestimated the
probability or severity of large losses. Unusually large and unexpected declines
in industry capital will result in a temporary capacity shortfall. After a large
shock that changes the perceived probability distribution of losses, insurers will
update their estimate of their existing exposure to risk associated with policies
currently outstanding. Because of their limited capital and increased exposure
to the risk in question, insurers will require a larger risk premium to bear
additional risk of this sort.
Many insurers may want to cede this risk rather than assuming more. If
reinsurance is available, insurers can rebalance existing exposures relatively
quickly.2' But if the reinsurance industry is also experiencing a temporary capital
shortage and an increased exposure to the risk, as is typically the case, insurers
(and reinsurers) may rebalance their exposures to the risk by waiting until
existing policies expire and not renewing, or, in the extreme, they may cancel
existing policies when cancellation is contractually possible.2 This situation has
been termed "risk overhang" in the literature.26
The problems from these capacity shortages tend to diminish over time for
full discussion of the motivations for corporate risk management are beyond the scope of this paper.
For more on the portfolio approach to corporate risk management, see Kenneth A. Froot et al., Risk
Management; Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing, 48 J. FIN. 1629 (Dec. 1993).
22. For a formal model of such an insurance market, see Gron & Winton, supra note 16, at
595, 596.
23. Priest, supra note 10, at 531.
24. Gron & Winton, supra note 16, at 606.
25. Priest, supra note 10, at 531.
26. Gron & Winton, supra note 16.
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three reasons. First, the high prices due to the high return for scarce capital allow
insurers (and reinsurers) to increase their internal capital. Second, those same
high returns provide incentives for insurers to access costly external capital and
for new entrants to come into the market. Third, insurers will reduce their risk
exposure by curtailing new coverage and renewals as noted. The duration of the
tight market conditions depends upon how quickly all three of these occur.
This theory of insurer behavior has some considerable empirical support. As
the theory would predict, measures of insurers' "capacity" (internal capital) bear
a significant relationship to insurers' profitability." Likewise, the theory predicts
that the effects of "overhang" on current markets will last longer if previously
issued policies have long-tailed coverage.28 For example, many liability policies
cover "occurrences" during the policy period, even if liability judgments
associated with them may not be forthcoming for many years because of delays
in litigation or latent injuries. Under property insurance, by contrast, coverage
is generally for "events" during the policy period, and there is little risk of a
covered loss coming to light after the policy period is over. Accordingly, risk
overhang will likely persist longer in liability insurance markets than in property
insurance markets if the theory is correct. Recent evidence supports the theory,
as the 1980s' liability insurance crisis lasted considerably longer than the early
1990s' catastrophe reinsurance crisis.29
Before leaving this preliminary economic discussion, we wish to touch on
one other point relating to large losses. As noted in the introduction, some types
of losses, such as acts of war, are generally excluded from coverage under
property-casualty policies.3" The preceding discussion adds to our understanding
of why this should be so. Losses associated with war will tend to be highly
correlated across policyholders. Consequently, they can seriously threaten
insurers' internal capital. A healthy insurer will thus be unwilling to sell
insurance for such risks without tacking on a substantial risk premium to the
price. The more the price of insurance exceeds its expected value, other things
being equal, the less the demand among potential insureds. This problem is
compounded by the fact that large correlated losses may impair insurers' capital
to the point that they will be unable to pay claims, a prospect that further reduces
the demand for insurance.
Thus, certain types of losses will only be insurable by the largest insurers
with the greatest capital reserves and the highest degree of global diversification.
As the number of potential insurers diminishes, market power issues may become
a concern. Some potential losses are so catastrophic and non-diversifiable that
no insurer will insure them for a price that customers will pay.
27. See Gron, supra note 19.
28. Gron & Winton, supra note 16, at 592 (explaining that "tail" means length of time that
it takes for a claim to be entered against an old insurance policy).
29. See id. at 601, 602 (reporting that the duration was roughly three years for the liability
crisis as compared with one and a half years for the catastrophe reinsurance crisis).
30. Priest, supra note 10, at 1540-43 (discussing why losses from nuclear war are
uninsurable).
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B. Implications for Terrorism Insurance
The events of September 11 and their aftermath changed the information
available to insurers in three ways. First, they suggested that the probability of
very large terrorism losses was significantly greater than previously thought, or,
in other words, the expected value of future losses rose considerably. Second,
and related, they greatly heightened the possibility that losses caused by terrorists
might be so large as to be uninsurable. Present concerns about the use of
weapons of mass destruction by terrorists suggest that terrorism losses might
conceivably be as great as those that might be experienced in wartime. Third,
they greatly increased the uncertainty in insurers' subjective probability
distributions regarding terrorism losses. The insurance industry must now adjust
to these new conditions.
The increase in both the mean and the variance of insurers' subjective
distribution of terrorism losses creates a short-term "crisis" in the availability of
terrorism coverage through the risk overhang phenomenon described above.
Insurers in the short term have increased the estimates of their exposure to
terrorism risk. Many insurers have found that they have more exposure relative
to their capital than they would like and are seeking to shed such coverage until
they can manage the risk better. For some insurers this may entail covering some
terrorism losses but managing them differently by selecting a different mix of
exposures, as by insisting on a broader geographic area for the same number of
risks.
As with past insurance crises, the problem is likely to go away with time.
Barring massive new terrorist attacks, insurers' capital will increase, the
perceived uncertainty about the distribution of losses will diminish, and insurers'
risk premia for covering terror-related losses will fall. Upward repricing of
future coverage for terror-related losses will then afford insurers a substantial
degree of confidence that the coverage will be profitable.
We may also expect insurers to take steps in the months ahead to protect
themselves against excessive exposure in the event of the most catastrophic
terrorist attacks. Exclusions will be rewritten for a number of particular
occurrences. "Act of war" exclusions, for example, may be rewritten to
incorporate more clearly the use of weapons of mass destruction by individuals
as well as by enemy states. The exclusion of any losses caused by such weapons,
especially nuclear weapons, may become more common, as may nuclear hazard
exclusions. "Bomb damage" is another category of loss that may become subject
to greater exclusions and limitations. Such coverage might be excluded from
basic casualty policies and available only through separate riders such as those
for earthquake and flood damage in many jurisdictions. Coverage through
separate riders allows insurers to take on risks selectively to ensure adequate
diversification and also allows coverage to be priced more proportionately to
each insured's exposure to risk. Insurers will also protect themselves through
dollar limits of liability as they always have in the past.
These adjustments are well underway. Indeed, insurers are again willing to
sell large amounts of coverage to airlines for ground damage caused by aircraft
[Vol. 36:447
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and are thus urging the government to exit that market. Coverage for terror
damage under property-casualty policies will likely return before long as well,
subject to the sorts of changes noted above.
Insurance companies are not the only sources of "insurance" against terror-
related losses. The catastrophe reinsurance crisis of the early 1990s spurred the
growth of new financial instruments that allow risks to be allocated to the capital
markets. Catastrophe futures and catastrophe bonds now allow any investor to
contract to make or receive state contingent payments in the event of disasters.
Payments, in the event of a catastrophic loss, are dependent on aggregate indices
of insurance industry losses, thus eliminating any adverse selection or moral
hazard that these contracts might otherwise produce.'
The adjustments that we describe for insurance markets are not yet complete,
and we cannot know quite when the market will settle into a new equilibrium.
One may therefore ask whether there is any role for government during the
transition to a more stable situation. Further, the new equilibrium will likely
entail some additional coverage exclusions, as well as limits on the dollar value
of coverage, which make certain risks uninsurable that might previously have
been covered. One can further ask whether government should step in to make
coverage of these risks available. To these issues we now turn.
lI. THE UNEASY (WEAK?) CASE FOR GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
Consistent with our prior discussion, it is useful to divide the analysis
between "transition" issues relating to the period of risk overhang and longer-
term issues relating to risks that are uninsurable in the private market.
A. Transition Issues
The transition is ongoing to a market free of the current risk overhang, and
its duration will depend on future experience with terrorism-related losses.
Initially governments around the world stepped in to provide ground damage
coverage for airlines on an ostensibly temporary basis. Since then, governments
in the United States, Germany, and France have passed government-sponsored
terrorism reinsurance programs.
With respect to airline coverage, at least part of the impetus for government
participation is regulatory. Airlines are required to carry substantial coverage for
ground damage (for which airlines are strictly liable under U.S. tort law), and
policy cancellations after September 11 evidently placed airlines into a situation
in which they could not comply with such regulations. As a result, airlines
subject to these cancellations were unable to fly legally. 2 Some adjustment of
government policy was in order at that point, and government provision of
31. See Christopher Lewis & Kevin Murdock, Alternative Means of Redistributing
Catastrophic Risk in a National Risk Management System, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE
RISK, supra note II, at 5 I.
32. See Terror in the Air: Governments Are Still Under Pressure to Insure Airline Risk
Terror, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 2002.
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insurance on a temporary basis may have been a reasonable choice among the
available options (regulatory waivers or changes in liability rules being the
others).
Even so, government involvement in the sale of airline coverage illustrates
one of the important potential problems with government participation in the
insurance market. At least some private insurers are once again willing to supply
coverage but the airline industry objects that it is too expensive. As a result,
government programs supplying temporary coverage have been extended beyond
their original expiration dates. This policy obviously raises the concern that
governments are supplying subsidized coverage, and that political pressures will
induce continued coverage. In that event, government becomes the problem
rather than the solution, crowding out private insurance with subsidized public
insurance and allowing airlines to externalize the risks they create.
More generally, one must ask whether there is some market failure that
government can constructively address. One familiar source of market failure is
market power. It is conceivable that risk overhang creates a window of time in
which market power may arise and be exploited. As noted above, some risks are
so large and non-diversifiable as to be uninsurable, and others are large enough
that only the most highly capitalized insurers will cover them. We would not
expect market power to afflict the market for coverage of the latter types of risks
in the long run because of competitive entry by large insurers or insurance
groups. However, in a market afflicted by risk overhang, only the very largest
insurer(s) with experience writing a particular kind of coverage might offer it for
a time. During that window, premiums might include not only a significant risk
premium but a monopoly markup as well.
The airline situation again offers a possible illustration. The largest
insurance group in the world by capitalization, American International Group,
Inc. ("AIG"), is precisely the group that has recently announced its willingness
to supply ground damage coverage to airlines in amounts comparable to those
available before September I1." However, the airlines complained vociferously
that this coverage is overpriced and have persuaded governments to remain in the
market for now. We cannot rule out the possibility that AIG's premiums contain
a monopoly markup. If so, government participation on a temporary basis might
be justified in principle. But it is also impossible to rule out the earlier
hypothesis that government coverage is a subsidy, and that the higher price of
private coverage reflects sensible repricing in the face of increased risk.
The broader question of whether the government should go beyond
assistance to airlines to supply other reinsurance coverage that the market will
not supply turns on somewhat different issues. As noted, the capacity limitations
that create risk overhang likely result from the relatively high cost of external
capital to insurers, particularly after a series of events that produces large,
unexpected losses. The high cost of external capital, in turn, is likely a product
of asymmetric information between insurers and capital markets and a related
33. See A Nation Challenged: The Insurers; Sales Are Resumedfor Coverage ofAirlinesfor
Terror Damage, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 25, 2001, at C4.
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fear of adverse selection by insurers with large exposure under existing policies.
A perceived shortage of coverage can also result from the high risk premiums
that insurers will charge to write new coverage when the uncertainty about
expected losses is great.
Can these circumstances be viewed as a "market failure" remediable by the
government? The answer is somewhat complicated. There can be no question
that conditions of asymmetric information reduce the efficiency of markets
relative to a world of perfect, symmetric information. To call this a "market
failure," however, is to indulge the nirvana fallacy. Governments are in no better
position than the capital markets to judge the riskiness of placing capital at risk
in insurance markets. Indeed, for reasons that we will elaborate in the next
section, there is good reason to think that when the government acts as an insurer,
its risk portfolio will be inferior to that of the private sector. Government
reinsurance, therefore, would likely be more threatened with adverse selection
than private reinsurance. We can think of no other policy instruments that
government might constructively employ to ameliorate the problem of
asymmetric information directly.
If an insurance market is suffering from unraveling due to adverse selection,
however, government may improve matters by making insurance coverage
mandatory. In theory, the same possibility seemingly exists for reinsurance
markets. It is difficult to imagine how mandatory reinsurance would be
constructed, and it is more difficult to imagine how government would determine
when a dearth of reinsurance (or a period where its price seems high) could be
addressed through any policy of mandatory reinsurance. Finally, when the
adverse selection problem is only temporarily acute following a shock to the
market, the danger arises that any government policies along these lines would
be outmoded by the time they were implemented.
One might also argue for government participation because private reinsurers
facing capacity constraints will charge substantial risk premiums to write
coverage that may result in large losses. These risk premiums relate to the
concavity of the profit function with respect to internal capital, which derives
from the high cost of external capital (and perhaps bankruptcy costs), as
previously noted. Arguably, government does not face these problems. In the
event of a large, unanticipated call on the resources of the government as
reinsurer, the government can still borrow in the capital markets at an attractive
rate (at least the major Western governments). It need not pay the sort of
premium that private insurers must pay to attract external capital, and it need not
worry about costs of financial distress. Thus, the argument might run, in normal
times when capacity constraints are not terribly important for private insurers,
government should not act as an insurer because the private insurers' small risk
premiums and their superior ability to manage and administer risk surely trumps
any gains from shifting risk to the less risk averse government. However, after
a large shock that creates risk overhang accompanied by large risk premiums to
compensate private insurers for writing new coverage, the government has a
substantial, albeit temporary, advantage in risk bearing, and should enter the
market to exploit it.
The difficulty with this argument for government involvement is that
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practical considerations may undermine any gains from temporary government
participation as an insurer or reinsurer. The risk overhang problem abates with
time, and may well diminish greatly before government can act to install a
sensible program. Once the government program is in place, it may long outlive
its usefulness. Government is unlikely to set premiums in actuarially sound
fashion, and political pressures for subsidies will be intense. Once subsidized
insurance is in place, a constituency to retain it indefinitely will emerge, and a
considerable risk arises that poorly managed, but inexpensive, government
insurance will crowd out efficiently structured private insurance.
In sum, we think it unlikely that government has much of a constructive role
to play as an insurer in addressing the problems associated with temporary
insurance "crises," whether in terrorism coverage or in some other line. In
offering this conclusion, we stipulate that some sort of response was appropriate
to avoid a regulatory shutdown of the airlines after September 11, and that
government provision of ground damage insurance on a temporary basis appears
to have been a tolerable response initially. The months to come should reveal
whether the government can resist airline industry pressure for long-term
subsidization of this coverage. We fear that if the government leaps into the
business of providing terrorism insurance because of the risk overhang in the
market, it could create long-term costs that would outweigh any short-term gains.
A mix of inertia and political pressures make it unlikely that the government will
respond properly, and in an appropriately transitory fashion, to these market
disruptions that history suggests will resolve on their own.
B. Long Term Issues
It remains to consider whether government has some role to play in the long
term. Thus, imagine a time in the not too distant future when insurers have
accumulated enough experience with terror-related losses to be willing to supply
coverage for the risks that they believe to be modest and diversifiable. Premiums
will be higher than before September 11, and terror coverage for some insureds
may have to be purchased separately. But coverage will be available in
substantial dollar limits at premiums that are not terribly in excess of actuaries'
best estimates of expected losses. At the same time, however, new exclusions in
standard policies will likely make coverage for certain catastrophic terrorist acts
unavailable altogether, such as acts involving the use of weapons of mass
destruction. Here, the unavailability of coverage is not a transitory result of risk
overhang, but a lasting manifestation of the fact that some losses are so large and
undiversifiable that private insurers will not agree to cover them.
Should government offer to insure these types of losses? One might begin
with a simple "no" based on the observation that there are numerous uninsurable
losses, and government does not generally step in to cover them. Governments
do not generally offer act of war coverage, for example, and it is not terribly
difficult to understand why. In the event of a large scale war, a government
promise to pay for losses might not be credible. Even in the event of smaller
scale conflicts where the government's ability to pay might not be in issue, the
optimal use of limited government resources may not be to reimburse property
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owners for their losses. The needs of national defense and the provisions of
emergency food, shelter and medical care, may well represent a higher priority.
This is not to suggest that government should do nothing in the event of a
national catastrophe that presents a privately uninsurable risk. Quite the
contrary, the government should and does assist those who have suffered losses.
It simply does so on the basis of an ex post assessment of priorities rather than
ex ante contracts with some subset of the population that has elected to purchase
insurance. The federal assistance to New York and the compensation fund for
victims of the September 1 1 attacks noted in the introduction are clear examples.
Ex post humanitarian assistance in lieu of ex ante insurance arrangements
assuredly fails to achieve optimal risk allocation in any sense. However,
government should have other considerations in its objective function besides
optimal risk sharing, including distributional considerations that pure insurance
markets will not address and the other sorts of expenditure priorities noted above.
It would be exceedingly difficult to write an ex ante contract that accurately
specified the act of war contingencies forwhich the government's promise to pay
was credible and that the fulfillment of such a promise would not divert scarce
resources from higher valued uses. This observation, we suggest, may well
suffice to justify an "ex post" approach to government assistance in the event of
attacks on the nation.
However, we are mindful of possible arguments to the contrary. One such
argument is that properly priced government insurance arrangements might create
valuable incentives. To the extent that certain types of activities or properties are
at greater risk of harm from terrorist attacks, appropriately calibrated insurance
premiums might discourage especially risky activities, discourage the
construction of new properties that might represent easy targets, and encourage
anti-terrorist precautions.
Such an argument must rest on the notion that ex post assistance provides a
de facto "insurance," the price of which is not connected to each insureds' risk,
which results in moral hazard. We do not doubt that ex post government
assistance will create some degree of moral hazard at the margin. Indeed a
number of writers have suggested that government disaster assistance creates
moral hazard in other contexts, such as with crop failure and flood insurance.34
These writers typically argue that market insurers are better able to police
adverse selection and moral hazard problems than government and urge that
government withdraw from disaster insurance and ex post disaster relief activities
whenever the government presence discourages the purchase of private insurance
that is otherwise available or "crowds out" private insurers.35
We concur, and we certainly do not entertain the possibility that government
should supplant private insurers or reinsurers in the provision of terrorism
coverage. The question here is a slightly harder one-should government shift
34. See George Priest, The Government, the Market, and the Problem of Catastrophe Loss,
12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219 (1996); see also Scott Harrington, Rethinking Disaster Policy, 23
REGULATION 40 (2000).
35. Id.
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from the provision of ex post assistance to ex ante insurance coverage with
respect to the terror risks that are uninsurable in the private market over the long
run? In particular, could such a shift be justified by the superior risk avoidance
incentives that would result? The answer, we believe, is "no," for two reasons.
First, although ex post aid in the event of terror attacks creates some degree
of moral hazard, the effect may be relatively modest because aid to terror victims
is likely quite incomplete and uncertain. For example, the notion that the owners
of the Sears Tower will eschew valuable precautions against terrorism on the
grounds that they expect something approaching full compensation from the
government in the event of its destruction seems uncompelling. It is also
uncompelling that Sears Tower owners can avoid any market penalty for lax
security" because its tenants are secure in the knowledge that their decedents will
receive compensation for their deaths. Here, the moral hazard problem is simply
far less acute than it is when farmers who plant their crops near a river that
regularly floods are routinely reimbursed for their losses.
Second, even if properly priced government insurance would create some
valuable incentives, there is little reason to expect that government insurance
would be properly priced. The critics of federal disaster policies have already
shown convincingly that when the federal government becomes involved in the
sale of insurance against disasters, it does little to classify risks or price policies
in an actuarially sound fashion. To the contrary, policies are typically subsidized
and lacking in experience-related pricing. Moreover, legislators cannot resist the
urge to aid disaster victims who prove to be uninsured after the fact, so rational,
potential insureds may decline to purchase insurance despite subsidized
premiums.36 In light of this experience, is there any reason to think that
government terrorism coverage would be priced in a way that generated useful
precautions against terror? Indeed, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
provides for federal reinsurance free of charge.
A second possible argument for government sale of ex ante insurance in lieu
of government ex post aid is that even if premiums would bear little relation to
those that an insurance industry actuary would set, accumulated premiums could
create a sizable fund that could be used to finance aid to victims. This argument,
too, seems unconvincing. Special government funds are fungible with general
revenues (remember the Social Security "lock box"?). There is little reason to
think that any such fund to aid terror victims would be segregated for the purpose
that it ostensibly serves. There is also little reason to think that a segregated fund
is necessary in any event. If the government needs a special reserve fund to aid
terror victims, why not one to finance wars or to cover expenditures during a
severe recession? Further, if a fund is somehow needed, what is the advantage
of accumulating reserves through insurance premiums rather than general
taxation? We have already disposed of the notion that insurance premiums are
likely to create valuable incentives, and we are not aware of any other potential
advantage to them. The notion that it is more equitable for potential terror
36. See Harrington, supra note 34, at 44; Moss, supra note 12, at 343-44; Priest, supra note
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victims to contribute disproportionately to the fund through insurance premiums
offers a possible argument, but a weak one at best, especially given that such
individuals and companies may well contribute disproportionately to tax
revenues already.
Even if government should not enter into the provision of terrorism
insurance, other policy changes might be constructive. It has long been
recognized that the tax treatment of insurance reserves against catastrophic loss
(income is taxed as it accumulates) forces premiums higher and reduces private
coverage. Other writers have urged reconsideration of this policy.37 Similarly,
we do not rule out the possibility that government might somehow aid in
promoting (or not impeding) alternative private instruments for laying off
terrorism risks in the capital markets, such as catastrophe bonds and futures. But
for the reasons given here, long-term government entry into the market for
privately uninsurable terrorism risks seems ill-advised.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons developed above, the case for more widespread government
participation in the market for terrorism insurance seems a weak one. Insurers
and insureds are already adjusting to the post-September 11 environment. We
fear that government involvement will prove at best unnecessary and at worst a
source of serious long-term distortions of the market place.
37. See Harrington, supra note 34, at 42.
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